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BRINGING UP BABY: MARYLAND MUST ADOPT AN 
EQUITABLE FRAMEWORK FOR RESOLVING FROZEN 
EMBRYO DISPUTES AFTER DIVORCE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In 2002, about sixty-two million women of reproductive age were 
living in the United States. 1 Of these sixty-two million women, 
roughly 10% of them sought medical advice for fertility-related 
problems at some point in the past. 2 As a result of the prevalence and 
success of modem assisted reproductive technology (ART)3 and in 
vitro fertilization (IVF),4 more than 48,000 children were born in 
2003. 5 In addition to live births, the increased use of ART had 
precipitated the storage of over 400,000 frozen embryos6 by 2003. 7 
1. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Assisted Reproductive Technology: 
Home, http://www.cdc.gov/artiindex.htm (last visited Feb. 21,2008). 
2. Id. 
3. Generally, 
ART procedures involve surgically removing eggs from a woman's 
ovaries, combining them with sperm in the laboratory, and returning them 
to the woman's body or donating them to another woman. They do NOT 
include treatments in which only sperm are handled (i.e., intrauterine---or 
artificial-insemination) or procedures in which a woman takes medicine 
only to stimulate egg production without the intention of having eggs 
retrieved. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
4. "In vitro fertilization (IVF), [is] the oldest and most well-known of ... [ART] 
technologies .... " IVF "involves medically stimulating the ovaries to produce eggs. 
These eggs are then removed from the woman's ovaries where they are placed in a 
culture, fertilized with sperm, incubated for several days, and then transferred into 
the uterus." Ellen A. Waldman, Disputing Over Embryos: Of Contacts and 
Consents, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 897,902-03 (2000). 
5. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Assisted Reproductive Technology 
(ART) Report: Introduction to the 2003 National Report, 
http://www.cdc.gov/artiart2003/nation.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008) ("The 122,872 
ART cycles performed ... in 2003 resulted in ... live births [of] 48,756 infants."). 
6. "The term 'frozen embryos' ... is the term of art denoting cryogenically-preserved 
preembryos." Jennifer Marigliano Dehmel, Comment, To Have Or Not To Have: 
Whose Procreative Rights Prevail In Disputes Over Dispositions of Frozen 
Embryos?, 27 CONN. L. REv. 1377, 1377 nA (1995). In this Comment, the term 
"embryo" and "preembryo" will be used interchangeably. 
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While the use of ART was increasing, divorce rates remained high 
on both a national and local level. 8 In the United States, 3.6 million 
divorces occurred during 2005.9 In Maryland, the divorce rate was 
nearly 50% in the year 2005. 10 
It is a logical assumption that a portion of the stored embryos are 
the result of divorced spouses who are unable to come to an 
agreement regarding the disposal of or use of the frozen embryos. 
The dearth of legislation and consistent judicial guidelines governing 
such claims hampers resolution to the dispute of frozen embryos after 
divorce. I 1 Only a handful of states have passed legislation governin~ 
how frozen embryos should be handled once a marriage ends. 1 
Maryland is not one of these states. 
Additionally, judicial approaches to settling disposition 
disagreements vary widely from state to state and "are insufficient to 
provide individuals and the courts with a means of regulating the 
disputes." 13 One court, in an embryo disposition dispute, noted that 
the ever-increasing number of cases dealing with the disposition of 
frozen embryos after divorce "will unquestionably spark further 
progression of the law.,,14 That court also warned that such laws 
must provide "clear, consistent principles to guide parties in 
protecting their interests and resolving their disputes.,,15 
7. Rick Weiss, 400,000 Human Embryos Frozen in u.s., WASH. POST, May 8, 2003, at 
AI0. This estimate was based on a survey of nearly all fertility clinics located in the 
United States. Id. 
8. See MARTHA L. MUNSON & PAUL D. SUTION; CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, AND DEATHS: PROVISIONAL DATA FOR 
2005 6 (2006). 
9. Id. at 1. 
10. See id. at 6. 
11. Nicole L. Cucci, Note, Constitutional Implications of In Vitro Fertilization 
Procedures, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 417, 438-39 (1998); Kellie LaGatta, Comment, 
The Frozen Embryo Debate Heats Up: A Call for Federal Regulation and 
Legislation, 4 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 99, 99 (2002). 
12. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 367g(b) (West 1999 & Supp. 2007) (requiring written 
permission from the gamete provider before using frozen embryos); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 742.17(2) (West 2005 & Supp. 2006) (empowering both gamete providers with 
equal decision making authority over frozen embryo disposition); LA. REv. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 9:121-9:133 (2000 & Supp. 2007) (terming frozen embryos biological 
human beings that may not be intentionally destroyed); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 
556(A)(1) (West 2000) (requiring written consent from both gamete providers before 
allowing the transfer of frozen embryos). 
13. LaGatta, supra note 11, at 115. 
14. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179 (N.Y. 1998). 
15. Id. 
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With this in mind, Maryland must enact legislation and create a fair 
and consistent judicial approach to resolving embryo disputes. 
Although Maryland courts have yet to see an embryo disposition 
case, given the statistics of the rising instances of ART, 16 such a case 
is inevitable. 
This Comment will analyze current judicial trends in assisted 
reproduction and their inherent gender biases. While this Comment 
will not assert that anyone approach is more favorable than another, 
it will offer suggestions on how to mitigate the disparate impact on 
women inflicted by these current approaches. 17 It is the author's 
hope that these approaches, when thoughtfully employed, will 
provide a fair outcome for all parties involved in embryo disposition 
disputes. 
Part II will provide an overview of the most widely employed 
judicial approaches to embryo disposition disputes. 18 In particular, 
Part II.A will address the most prevalent theory to embryo dispute 
resolution: the contractual the070; 19 Part II.B will discuss the 
contemporaneous consent model; 0 and Part II.C will discuss the 
balancinglbest interest test. 21 
Part III of this Comment will touch briefly on the current 
legislative approaches to governing embryo dispute cases,22 although 
it is not the core subject of this Comment. The author feels, however, 
that ultimately Maryland will have to create a legislative solution to 
this dilemma, and thus an awareness of current legislative trends is 
helpful. 
Part IV will provide an overview of the four most common 
categories of legal status applied to frozen embryos.23 Though some 
analysis is provided in this section, in-depth discussion is outside the 
scope of this Comment. The author believes, however, that in order 
to properly address frozen embryo disputes, courts must have a 
framework in place by which the legal status of the embryos can be 
analyzed. 
Part V will then discuss weaknesses in the most common judicial 
approach, the contractual theory, and also discuss varying problems 
16. Dehmel, supra note 6, at 1377. 
17. See infra Parts V.B-C. 
18. See infra Part II. 
19. See infra Part II.A. 
20. See infra Part II.B. 
21. See infra Part H.C. 
22. See infra Part III. 
23. See infra Part IV. 
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with the balancingibest interest test. 24 Specifically, Part V.A 
addresses the failure of the contractual theory to yield equitable 
results. 25 Part V.B focuses on inherent gender bias in today's current 
application of the balancingibest interest test. 26 Part V.C discusses 
how the "right not to parent" results in unfair outcomes to women. 27 
Throughout Part V, this Comment will introduce suggested 
modifications to these approaches that would result in more equitable 
judicial decisions. 
Although this Comment focuses on the disparate effect on women 
of the current judicial approaches and offers a framework more 
favorable for the unique position of women in reproduction, the 
author does not intend to suggest that infertile men have less of a 
right to frozen embryos created by their gametes than do infertile 
women. As this scenario is encountered less often in such cases,28 it 
is outside the scope of this Comment. 
II. BACKGROUND 
When faced with the problem of the disposition of frozen embryos 
after divorce, courts have primarily relied on three approaches when 
rendering their decisions: the contractual approach; the 
contemporaneous mutual consent model; and the balancingibest 
interest test. 29 
A. The Contractual Approach 
The contractual approach asserts that any agreements entered into 
at the time of ART treatment should be considered valid and binding 
"so long as they do not violate public policy.,,3o By honoring 
contracts entered into prior to treatment advocates argue that it 
endows individuals with the power to make personal decisions, and 
so keeps personal decision making outside the reach of the state or 
24. See infra Part V. 
25. See infra Part V.A. 
26. See infra Part V.B. 
27. See infra Part V.C. 
28. See Ellen Waldman, The Parent Trap: Uncovering the Myth of "Coerced 
Parenthood" in Frozen Embryo Disputes, 53 AM. U. L. REv. 1021, 1061 (2004) 
(arguing that when "treatment for prostate cancer or other illnesses. , . [impairs or 
destroys] a man's reproductive capacity," and "a man's interest in using existing 
embryos to achieve genetic parenthood is as compelling as that of the aging divorcee 
who can no longer produce viable eggs"). 
29. Witten v. Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 774 (Iowa 2003). 
30. [d. at 776 (citing Lowitz v. Lowitz, 48 P.3d 261,271 (Wash. 2002); Kass v. Kass, 
696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.w.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 
1992)). 
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the courtS. 31 This approach is considered the "currently prevailing" 
form of analysis. 32 Scholarly criticism of this analysis nevertheless 
exists because some argue it fails to "protect[] the individual and 
societal interests at stake.,,33 
1. Case Law 
a. Roman v. Roman 
Roman v. Roman,34 a case of first impression for the Texas Court 
of Appeals, involved the disposition of three frozen embryos created 
by the parties after many unsuccessful attempts to achieve pregnancy 
by other means. 35 In this case, both the husband and wife signed an 
"Informed Consent for Cryopreservation of Embryos" at the fertility 
clinic before undergoing any procedures. 36 This "embryo 
agreement," as the court called it, contained a clear term in which 
both parties agreed to destruction of the embryos if the parties 
divorced. 37 
After the parties filed for divorce they participated in mediation to 
resolve the issues surrounding the divorce. 38 They were successful in 
all areas except for the disposition of the three frozen embryos, which 
the trial court ultimately awarded to the wife. 39 The Court of 
Appeals of Texas, First District, anticipating that legislation would 
eventually provide an answer to the issue at hand, confined its 
analysis to whether the embryos were properly awarded to the wife in 
light of the written agreement. 40 
31. /d. at 776-77 (quoting Kass; 696 N.E.2d at 180). 
32. Id. at 776 (citing Lowitz, 48 P.3d at 271; Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180; Davis, 842 S.W.2d 
at 597). 
33. Id. at 777 (quoting Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous 
Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. 
REv. 55, 88-89 (1999); Christina C. Lawrence, Note, Procreative Liberty and the 
Preembryo Problem: Developing a Medical and Legal Framework to Settle the 
Disposition o/Frozen Preembryos, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 721, 729 (2002)). 
34. 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App. 2006). In addition to the contractual approach model, the 
court also seems to acknowledge the contemporaneous mutual consent model when it 
subjects the authority of an embryo agreement contract to "mutual change of mind." 
Id. at 50. The thrust of the court's analysis, however, is that "[a]bsent ambiguity, [the 
court] interpret[s] a contract as a matter of law." Id. 
35. Id. at 41-42. 
36. /d. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 43. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 45. 
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Texas law, the court noted, is rather contradictory with regard to 
the issue of parenthood, consent, and ART. 41 The law requires both 
the consent of the husband and wife before undergoing ART 
procedures, yet concedes that "a child may be born without the 
husband's consent.,,42 More importantly, the court noted, is the 
absence of any legislation specifically addressing how best to 
"determine the disposition of the embryos in case of a contingency 
such as death or divOfce.,,43 
Given the lack of legislation or case law on point, the court looked 
to the state's gestational agreements and case law from other 
jurisdictions for guidance. 44 In light of its findings, the court found 
in favor of the husband and, hence, for the destruction of the 
embryos.45 
In support of its decision, the court stated that "allowing the parties 
voluntarily to decide the disposition of frozen embryos in advance of 
cryopreservation, subject to mutual change of mind, jointly 
expressed, best serves the existing public policy" of the state of 
Texas. 46 
The court also refused to imply language and meaning to the 
contract that was not already within its four comers;47 the court thus 
did not take into consideration that a party's decision to sign an 
agreement was not "fully considered" at the time it was signed. 48 
Rather, the court focused on the clarity of the language of the embryo 
agreement49 and, embracing the mantra of the Kass court, asserted 
that such agreements "should thus be gresumed valid and should be 
enforced as between the progenitors. '" 
b. Kass v. Kass 
In Kass v. Kass,51 the Court of Appeals of New York ruled on the 
disposition of five embryos created during a marriage. 52 After the 
marriage ended in divorce, the wife claimed that the embryos were 
41. Id. at 49. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. See id. at 49-50. 
45. Id. at 55. 
46. Id. at 50. 
47. Id. at 52. 
48. Id. at 53. 
49. Id. at 52. 
50. Id. at 50 (quoting Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992); Kass v. Kass, 
696 N.E.2d 174,180 (N.Y. 1998». 
51. 696N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998). 
52. Id. at 175. 
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"her only chance for genetic motherhood. ,,53 In contrast, the husband 
argued that use of the embryos would impose upon him the "burdens 
of unwanted fatherhood.,,54 Additionally, the husband asserted that 
the parties had agreed, in the event of the couple's divorce, that the 
embryos would be donated to the IVF program for research 
purposes. 55 
Before cryopreservation of the embryos occurred, the couple 
signed several forms relating to disposition of the embryos, including 
a statement which read: "In the event of divorce, we understand that 
legal ownership of any stored pre-zygotes must be determined in a 
property settlement and will be released as directed by order of a 
court of competent jurisdiction. ,,56 
The New York State Supreme Court awarded custody to the wife 
after determining that the wife, as a female, has "exclusive decisional 
authori~ over the fertilized eggs" just as she would over a "nonviable 
fetus." 5 The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second 
Department, however, reversed this decision, holding that a woman's 
bodily integrity was not implicated prior to implantation and that the 
parties had a valid agreement regarding the disposition of the 
embryos. 58 As a result, the appellate division held that this 
agreement should govern. 59 
The Court of Appeals of New York agreed with the appellate 
division and clearly affirmed its decision that "a woman's right of 
privacy or bodily integrity" are not implicated "in the area of 
reproductive choice.,,6o 
The court's analysis focused more on the agreement that had been 
signed by the parties prior to the divorce and less on any implications 
the decision may have had with regard to rights of privacy and bodily 
53. ld. 
54. ld. 
55. !d. 
56. ld. at 176; see also id. at 175 n.1 (defining eggs that are fertilized but do not yet 
contain the genetic material from the sperm as pre-zygotes). 
57. ld. at 177. 
58. ld. 
59. !d. 
60. ld. at 179. The court also quickly dispensed with any argument that the frozen 
embryos were entitled to Constitutional protection, emphasizing that the embryos 
were not "recognized as 'persons' for constitutional purposes." ld. (citing Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161-62 (1973) (indicating that "unborn [children] have never 
been recognized in the law as . . . whole" persons, and thus are not afforded all 
constitutional protections)). 
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integrity.61 The court held that disposition agreements such as the 
one at issue between Mr. and Mrs. Kass should "generally be 
presumed valid and binding" and completely enforceable in any 
I d· 62 eventua Ispute. 
The court noted the importance of encouraging the involved parties 
to clearly think through all possible contingencies before signing 
disposition agreements but acknowledged "the extraordinary 
difficult?," in fully understanding the implications of unknown future 
events.6 Regardless of a party's inability to foresee events related to 
marriage and disposition, the Court of Appeals of New York held that 
where parties have "clearly manifested their intention, the law will 
honor it.,,64 
B. The Contemporaneous Mutual Consent Model 
The contemporaneous mutual consent model is similar to the 
contractual approach in that it asserts that parties who contribute 
frozen embryos should make decisions regarding the disposition of 
those embryos, and each party is entitled to "an equal say in how the 
embryos should be disposed.,,65 
In a manner different from the contractual theory, however, this 
approach gives substantial weight to the idea that people are likely to 
change their minds about disposition after the embryos have been 
frozen. 66 It is thus "impossible" to expect a person to make a rational 
and binding choice prior to freezing the embryos. 67 This approach 
acknowledges that the decisions regarding disposition have "lifelong 
consequences for a person's identity and sense of self.,,68 This model 
therefore suggests that parties may only use, donate, or destroy the 
61. See id. at 179-80. 
62. Id. at 180 (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (holding "that an 
agreement regarding disposition of any untransferred preembryos in the event of 
contingencies ... should be presumed valid" and enforceable); John A. Robertston, 
In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437, 463-69 
(1990) (analyzing the implications and enforceability of joint directives for the 
disposition of embryos». 
63. Id. The court additionally noted that the parties' wishes regarding disposition of the 
embryos, as expressed prior to the eruption of a dispute, should always be 
"uppermost in the analysis" of disposition disagreements. Id. The court also stated 
that if such agreements are only enforceable while parties continue to agree, then 
they become ineffectual. See id. 
64. Id. at 182. 
65. Witten v. Witten, 672 NW.2d 768, 777 (Iowa 2003). 
66. Id. at 777-78. 
67. Id. at 777. 
68. Id. at 778. 
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embryos if both parties agree. 69 As a result, agreements into which 
parties enter prior to the creation of the embryos are not binding. 70 
1. Case Law 
a. A.Z. v. B.Z. 
In A.Z. v. B.Z.i 71 the parties attempted to conceive naturally shortly 
after marriage. 7 After the wife suffered an ectopic pregnancy and 
underwent the removal of her left fallopian tube,73 however, the 
couple sought fertility treatment in order to become pregnant. 74 
Eventually the couple succeeded, and the wife gave birth to twin 
daughters. 75 During the final fertilization attempt, several excess 
embryos were not imllanted in the wife's womb and were frozen for 
potential future use.7 
When the couple filed for divorce several years later, the excess 
frozen embryos became the subject of dispute. 77 Before each 
treatment, the couple had signed numerous consent forms re~arding 
the disposition of the embryos in case of death or divorce. The 
wife modified the initial form to state that she, upon separation, 
would retain the rights to the frozen embryos.79 The husband signed 
this consent form as well. 80 Subsequent consent forms, however, 
were blank when signed by the husband and then modified later by 
the wife to read exactly as the initial consent form read, which 
granted the wife custody of any frozen embryos. 81 
The court noted that this case was the first in which an embryo 
agreement granted one party the right to use the embryos for personal 
implantation. 82 The court, however, doubted the enforceability of the 
agreement for several reasons: the lack of evidence showing that the 
69. [d. 
70. ld. 
71. 72SN.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000). 
72. [d. at 1052. 
73. !d. "An ectopic pregnancy is one that occurs outside the uterus, the normal locus of 
pregnancy." ld. at 1052 n.6 (citing STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 488 (25th ed. 
1990». 
74. [d. at 1052. 
75. [d. at 1053. 
76. [d. 
77. See id. at 1052-53. 
78. See id. at 1053-54. 
79. [d. at 1054. 
80. ld. 
81. [d. 
82. ld. at 1056. 
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couple intended the consent fonn to be a binding agreement; the 
change in circumstances created by the birth of their daughters; and 
the lack of clarity in the meaning of the words "become separated" 
used in the consent fonn. 83 
Even if the consent fonn had been unambiguous, however, the 
court stated that it would still refuse to enforce such an agreement 
based on public policy.84 The court stated: 
[W]e conclude that, even had the husband and the wife 
entered into an unambiguous agreement between themselves 
regarding the disposition of the frozen preembryos, we 
would not enforce an agreement that would compel one 
donor to become a parent against his or her will. As a 
matter of public policy, we conclude that forced procreation 
is not an area amenable to judicial enforcement. It is well-
established that courts will not enforce contracts that violate 
public policy. 85 
In order to detennine public policy, the court turned to legislation 
for guidance. 86 It noted that Massachusetts legislation barred 
contracts forcing people into familial relationships-a parent/child 
relationship, even absent an emotional bond, is one such 
relationship. 87 In sum, the court stated that to force the unwilling 
husband into fatherhood would not be "an area amenable to judicial 
enforcement. ,,88 
C. The Balancing/Best Interest Test 
The balancing or best interest test weighs the interests of both 
parties, while rejecting the necessity of mutual consent and 
contractual enforcement. 89 This approach asserts that where parties 
are in disagreement as to the disposition of frozen embryos, courts 
83. See id. at 1056-57. 
84. Id. at 1057-58. 
85. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Exxon Corp. v. Esso Workers' Union, Inc., 118 F.3d 
841, 84~5 (1 st Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by E. Associated Coal 
Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 531 U.S. 57, 61 (2000); Beacon Hill Civic 
Ass'n v. Ristorante Toscano, Inc., 662 N.E.2d 1015, 1017 (Mass. 1996); 
Commonwealth v. Henry's Drywall Co., 320 N.E.2d 911, 915 (Mass. 1974». 
86. Id. at 1058. 
87. See id. at 1058-59. 
88. Id. at 1057-58. 
89. See Witten v. Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 779 (Iowa 2003) (citing I.B. v. M.B., 783 
A.2d 707, 718-19 (N.J. 2001». 
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are to look at the parties individually and evaluate each party's own 
interest in either the preservation or destruction of the embryos. 90 
1. Case Law 
a. J.B. v. M.B. 
In JB. v. M.B.,91 a married couple learned that the wife had a 
condition that would make it difficult for her to conceive.92 The 
couple sought medical treatment and successfully conceived a child 
after in vitro fertilization. 93 The facility that conducted the treatment 
required the husband and wife to sign a consent form prior to 
treatment, 94 The form stated that, in the event of divorce, "all 
control, direction, and ownership" of the resulting embryos would 
belong to the fertility clinic unless otherwise determined by a court 
order."95 
Upon separation, the couple had seven embryos in storage at the 
fertility clinic. 96 Consequently, the wife sought a court order from 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey requiring that the embryos be 
destroyed, arguing that she had "endured the in vitro [fertilization J 
process" in order to use them "in the context of an intact family.,,9 
The husband filed a counterclaim requesting that the court allow the 
embryos to be donated to other infertile couples. 98 
The parties offered very different bases for their claims. 99 The 
husband asserted that the destruction of the embryos "violated his 
constitutional rights to procreation and the care and companionship 
of his children." 1 00 He argued that these constitutional rights 
outweighed his wife's "right not to procreate because her right to 
bodily integrity [was] not implicated." 101 Conversely, the wife 
argued that New Jersey public policy prevented forcing individuals 
into familial relationships. 102 
90. Id. (citingJ.B., 783 A.2d at 719). 
91. 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001). 
92. Id. at 709. 
93. !d. at 709-10. 
94. Id. 
95. [d. at 710. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. 
100. 
101. 
See id. at 712. 
Id. 
Id. 
102. Id. 
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While the court found that the si¥ned consent fonn did not clarify 
the original intent of the parties,IO it noted that the "thrust" of the 
agreement was that the fertility clinic "obtains control over the 
pre embryos unless the parties choose otherwise in writing, or unless a 
court specifically directs otherwise.,,104 Because there was no 
separate writing memorializing the parties' intentions, the court 
found that it was within its own jurisdiction to detennine the fate of 
the embryos. 105 
The court acknowledged the novelty and complexity of the case, 
noting that medical advancements in ART have outpaced legal 
advancements on the issue. 106 Likewise, it recognized that at the 
time parties enter into embryo agreements, a couple is unlikely to 
anticipate the possibility of divorce. 107 The court further stated that 
both parties provide necessary biological material for the creation of 
the embryos and, as such, decisions regarding disposition should be 
made jointly. 108 
To reach its decision in favor of the wife's request to destroy the 
embryos, the court noted that the husband's ability to procreate was 
not limited by the destruction of the embryos because his fertility was 
not impaired; his constitutional rights were thus spared. 109 
Conversely, the wife's right not to procreate might be lost through 
donation of the embryos, as she would be forced to become a 
biological mother against her will. 110 The court refused to saddle the 
wife with the burden of knowing she might have biological children 
living without her knowledge, if the embryos were donated. III 
Although the court acknowledged the arguments for enforcing 
embryo agreements, it felt that the "better rule" was to allow such 
agreements to be subject to change. 112 The court focused on the 
103. Id. at 713. 
104. Id. 
105. See id. at 714-15. 
106 .. - See id. at 715. The court stated that "there are few guideposts for decision-making. 
Advances in medical technology have far outstripped the development of legal 
principles to resolve the inevitable disputes arising out of the new reproductive 
opportunities now available." Id. 
107. Id. 
108. 
109. 
110. 
See id. (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588,597 (Tenn. 1992) (finding that both 
members of a couple have an interest in the disposition of their embryos); Coleman, 
supra note 33, at 83 (arguing that both the male and female donor'should have 
mutual decision-making authority over embryo's disposition)). 
Id. at 717. 
Id. 
III. See id. 
112. Id. at 719 (stating that either party should be allowed to change his or her mind up 
until the destruction or implantation of the frozen embryos). 
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public policy of limitations on contracts involving family 
relationships and argued that public policy would be furthered by 
allowing a party to back out of a decision regarding future embryo 
use.
113 The court noted that, although the courts consider them 
conditional, most embryo agreements will govern so that clinics and 
parties would be able to rely on the enforcement of their terms. 114 
The court specifically refused to address the issue of how a claim 
would be resolved if an infertile party wanted, against the wishes of 
his or her partner, to use frozen embryos in order to become a 
biological parent.I IS 
b. Davis v. Davis 
The balancinglbest interest test was clearly illustrated in Davis v. 
Davis."6 In Davis, upon the dissolution of their marriage, the parties 
were unable to agree on the disposition of seven frozen embryos 
created during the marriage. I 17 After the trial court granted 
"custody" to the wife, Mary Sue, on the basis that the embryos were 
human bein~s and could not be destroyed, the husband, Junior Lewis, 
appealed. II The intermediate appellate court overruled the trial 
court and stated that there was "no compelling state interest" in 
forcing parenthood on an unwilling partner, and as a result, the 
parties should have joint control. I 19 Mary Sue sought review by the 
Supreme Court of Tennessee, which granted certiorari, not because it 
disagreed with the decision of the appellate court, "but because of the 
obvious importance of the case in terms of the development of law 
regarding the new reproductive technologies, and because the 
decision of the Court of Appeals [of Tennessee] does not give 
adequate guidance to the trial court in the event the parties cannot 
agree." 120 
Although the Davis court stated that embryo agreements into which 
parties enter should be "presumed valid," it simultaneously 
113. [d. 
114. [d. 
115. [d. at 720. 
116. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). The Supreme Court of Tennessee balanced the 
parties' interests by considering "the positions of the parties, the significance of their 
interests, and the relative burdens that will be imposed by differing resolutions." Id. 
at 603, The Davis case also addressed whether frozen embryos are persons or 
property. ld. at 594-97. This secondary issue is beyond the scope of this ~omment. 
117. !d. at 589. 
118. ld. 
119. [d. 
120. Id. at 590. 
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acknowledged that such agreements are so emotionally charged that 
they are nearly impossible to enter into with truly informed 
consent. 121 The court also briefly acknowledged that in some 
situations, estoppel by the pa~ wishing to utilize the frozen embryos 
may be a plausible argument. I 2 
Ultimately, the court found that the resolution to the instant 
problem "tumI ed] on the parties' exercise of their constitutional right 
to privacy.,,12 The Davis court noted that the u.s. Supreme Court 
had implied this right to decide "whether to bear or beget a child.,,124 
Using this approach for the instant case, the court looked at the 
balance between the parties' rights to have children and their rights 
not to have children. 125 The court then stated that in vitro 
fertilization was a scenario ripe with "inherent tension" between 
these two rights. 126 
The Davis court, although it acknowledged that the wife was 
affected to a much a greater extent than her husband by the IVF 
process, refused to afford her greater influence over the fate of the 
embryos than that of her husband. 127 The court reasoned that the 
parties should be viewed in light of the possibility of their potential 
parenthood-both the happiness it involves for the party who desires 
it, and the burden it imposes for the party who does not. 128 Under 
this approach, the court felt the farties should be viewed "as entirely 
equivalent gamete-providers.,,12 
The Davis court also noted that not only were the parties' decisions 
regarding procreation immune from outside interference, but that 
Tennessee's interest in encouraging procreation was not sufficient to 
override an individual's choices regarding procreation. l3O 
Ultimately, the court embraced a balancing approach to determine 
whose rights should prevail. 131 The court looked at whether the wife 
should prevail in her desire to procreate or whether the husband 
121. [d. at 597. 
122. See id. at 598. 
123. [d. 
124. [d. at 600 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)); see also Carey v. 
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (recognizing that "[t]he decision 
whether or not to beget or bear a child is ... [a] constitutionally protected choice[],'). 
125. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601. 
126. [d. 
127. [d. 
128. Jd. 
129. Jd. 
130. [d. at 602. 
131. /d. at 603. 
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should be allowed to avoid unwanted procreation. 132 To determine 
whose interest was greater, the court addressed the possible burdens 
imposed on the husband should he become a father. 133 The court 
listed possible burdens imposed on the husband, which included: the 
psychological results of unwanted fatherhood stemming from the 
divorce of his parents and the financial burdens of caring for a 
child. 134 Additionally, the court pointed out that if the embryos were 
used by another infertile couple, the husband would spend his life 
wondering if he was a biological parent. 135 The court felt that the 
resulting situation would defeat the husband's "procreational 
autonomy" and bar him from developing a relationship with any 
subsequent children. 136 
On the other hand, the court only realized one burden imposed on 
the wife-if the wife were unable to prevail in her desire to donate 
the pre-embryo to another infertile couple, she would only face the 
knowledge that the extensive IVF treatment she underwent had been 
for naught. 137 The court noted, however, that if the wife had been 
seeking the pre-embryos for her own personal use, and she were 
unable to become a parent by other "reasonable means," then the 
outcome of this case would have been less clear. 138 
III. LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES 
A. Current Trends in Legislation 
The existence of state legislation governing embryo disposition 
disputes is sparse. 139 Even those states that have legislation in place, 
with regard to embryo disposition agreements, avoid establishing the 
validity and enforceability of such agreements; 140 current legislation 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. !d. at 603-04. 
135. !d. at 604. 
136. !d. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. See LaGatta, supra note II, at 107-08. 
141. Id. The article notes that as of 2002, "only six states-Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania-[had] legislation specifically 
attempting to resolve the problems associated with IVF." Id. at 108; see also FLA. 
STAT. § 742.17 (2005 & Supp. 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6702 (2002); Ky. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 311.715 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:122-133 (2000 & 
Supp. 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-8:13-15 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 
2007)); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3212(e), 3216(c) (West 2000). At that time, 
Florida and New Hampshire required parties seeking IVF treatment to sign 
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fails to address the rights of parties involved in embryo disposition 
d· 141 lsputes. 
Another weakness in state legislation regarding embryo disposition 
is that the laws vary greatly from state to state. 142 This results in 
increasing "difficulty in determining the rights to frozen embryos and 
determining the enforceability of agreements concerning the 
disposition of unused embryos.,,143 As a result of such legislative 
inconsistencies, some scholars call for a "[f1ederal uniform Rolicy" 
with regard to the disposition of frozen embryos after divorce. 44 
Moreover, some state laws regarding embryo disposition implicate 
larger issues, such as the question of when life begins. 14 For 
example, "Louisiana law adamantly prohibits the destruction of 
viable embryos because the legislature considers the embryos to be 
human beings.,,146 Similarly, "Kentucky ... [has enacted laws] 
prohibit[ing] the intentional destruction of an embryo.,,147 Critics of 
IVF-related legislation assert that "[f1etal personhood" laws deprive 
women of equality in the eyes of the law. 148 As a result, feminist 
critics of personhood laws worry that rights are being taken "away 
disposition forms. Id. at 109; see also FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (2005 & Supp. 2006); 
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:21 (LexisNexis 2001). 
141. LaGatta, supra note 11, at 108; see also FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (2005 & Supp. 2006); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6702 (2002); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.715 (West 2006); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:122-133 (2000 & Supp. 2007); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 
168-B:13-15 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2007); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3212(e), 
3216(c) (West 2000). 
142. LaGatta, supra note 11, at 108. 
143. Id.; see also Elizabeth A. Trainor, Annotation, Right of Husband, Wife, or Other 
Party to Custody of Frozen Embryo, Pre-embryo, or Pre-zygote in Event of Divorce, 
Death or Other Circumstances, 87 A.L.R. 5th 253,261 (2001) (discussing the birth 
oflaw that can be used to determine the enforceability of embryo agreements). 
145. LaGatta, supra note 11, at Ill. Author, Kellie LaGatta, asserts that a federal 
regulation governing the disposition of frozen embryos in dispute would "help to 
prevent [and resolve] later disagreements without interfering with fundamental rights 
of reproductive autonomy." Id. at 112. 
145. See id. at 108; see also LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:123-133 (2000 & Supp. 2007). 
146. LaGatta, supra note 11, at 109; see also LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:122-133 (2000 & 
Supp. 2007). 
147. LaGatta, supra note 11, at 108; see also Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.715 (West 
2006). 
148. Lisa McLennan Brown, Feminist Theory and the Erosion of Women's Reproductive 
Rights: The Implications of Fetal Personhood Laws and In Vitro Fertilization, 13 
AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'y & L. 87, 103-04 (2005). 
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from women in the reproductive choice arena, instead of increasing 
joint decision-making." 149 
Proponents of federal legislation argue that increased joint 
decision-making will be overcome by "careful legislation." 150 This 
legislation, scholars assert, should require counseling prior to 
undergoing IVF treatment; such a requirement would force "parties 
to seriously think" about the repercussions of their decisions. 151 
Arguably, such legislation would encourage shared decision-making 
over the fate of the embryos, thus equalizing the power of the 
parties. 152 
IV. THE LEGAL STATUS OF FROZEN EMBRYOS 
A. Current Approaches to Classifying the Legal Status of Frozen 
Embryos 
Before a court tackles the problem of who should have control over 
the disposition of frozen embryos after divorce, it is imperative that 
the court determine under which legal "classification" the embryos 
fall. IS3 There are four such classifications that have been developed: 
the "right-to-life" approach; the "current constitutional view of the 
Supreme Court"~ the "special respect" approach; and the "private 
property view." I 4 
The right-to-life classification is the most restrictive of the 
classifications concerning the rights of progenitors, and it endows the 
embryo its own set of "full rights and protections." I 55 This ,}?proach 
has sparked concern and criticism from feminist scholars. 15 These 
critics worry that by endowing embryos with personhood rights, the 
149. Id. at 104. The author further notes that "legislation ... enacted so far consistently 
has regulated the actions of women and reinforced the status quo instead of 
undermining it." Id. 
ISO. LaGatta, supra note II, at 113. 
lSI. Id.atI14. 
153. Id. The author also notes that "subjective judicial discretion" would be solved by 
federal legislation and advocates following the lead of other nations, such as 
Australia and the United Kingdom, which have enacted such laws. Id. at liS. 
153. Dehmel, supra note 6, at 1382. 
154. Jd. at 1382-83. The "current constitutional view of the Supreme Court" is 
encompassed in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973). 
ISS. Dehmel, supra note 6, at 1382 (quoting Jennifer L. Carow, Note, Davis v. Davis: An 
Inconsistent Exception to an Otherwise Sound Rule Advancing Procreational 
Freedom and Reproductive Technology, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 523,538 (1994». The 
author also notes that this stance is currently embraced by the Roman Catholic 
Church. Id. at 1382 n.41. 
156. See Brown, supra note 148, at 91-92. 
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liberty interests gained by women in Roe v. Wade are severely 
undermined. 157 
The current constitutional view of the Supreme Court, on the other 
hand, does not view an embryo as a legal person. 158 The effect of 
this view is that a fetus is not afforded rights until it has undergone a 
live birth. 159 By extension, "frozen preembryo[s] must [also] fall 
short of the Supreme Court's definition ofa 'person.",160 
The special respect classification takes into consideration the 
possibility that a frozen embryo may eventually develop into a human 
being. 161 Advocates of a special respect approach believe embryos 
are imbued with a "unique moral significance" that acts to remind us 
of the "unique gift of human existence." 162 Proponents of this 
classification argue that, because embryos cannot process emotion 
and thought, they are not individuals, and thus, embryos are not 
persons to be afforded the full protection such legal status would 
offer. 163 Critics argue, however, that a special respect framework 
could become "a slippery slope where preembryos and other 
nonviable entities consisting of human genetic material" obtain rights 
that outweigh those of the gamete providers. 164 
The private property approach focuses not on the embryo itself, but 
rather it looks to see which party may "have 'rights' or 'property' 
interests in them." 165 To determine those rights and interests, 
proponents of this classification give great weight to the procreational 
157. Id. at 91. For example, Louisiana state law defines "an in vitro fertilized human 
ovum [as] a biological human being" and specifically rejects the argument that frozen 
embryos are property. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9: 126 (2000). The law also states that 
identified gamete providers retain all rights as parents of the fertilized ovum, but if 
the gamete providers "fail to express their identity," then the embryos must be 
protected until "adoptive implantation can occur" in order to "protect the in vitro 
fertilized human ovum's rights." Id. 
158. Dehmel, supra note 6, at 1383. This is the approach currently held by the United 
States Supreme Court. Id. 
159. Jd. (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 160-62). 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. (quoting John Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 
76 VA. L. REv. 437, 447 (1990». 
163. See id. at 1383-84. The author also notes that the special respect approach has 
gained the most popularity and support both internationally and in the United States. 
Jd. at 1384. 
164. Fotini Antonia Skouvakis, Comment, Defining the Undefined: Using a Best Interests 
Approach to Decide the Fate of Cryopreserved Preembryos in Pennsylvania, 109 
PENN. ST. L. REV. 885, 892 (2005). 
165. Dehmel, supra note 6, at 1384. 
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rights of the gamete providers. 166 Additionally, this approach instills 
equal rights in gamete providers because the embryos are not yet 
implanted in a woman's body; the private pro~erty approach, 
therefore fails to implicate bodily integrity issues. 1 7 The "private 
property" approach has been criticized for its classification of frozen 
embryos as mere chattel and for failing to provide any legal 
protection to the embryos. 168 
The importance of establishing a consistent judicial classification 
for frozen embryos is illustrated by Davis v. Davis. 169 The Davis 
dispute was heard in three levels of the court system in Tennessee, 
and each court used "an entirely different legal analysis" to determine 
the status of the embryos.170 The result was that each court reached a 
different outcome: the trial court labeled the embryos '''children, in 
vitro' and awarded custody of them to the mother"; the court of 
appeals suggested the embryos were property and granted joint 
custody; and the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the embryos 
were "neither persons nor property, but rather entitled to 'special 
respect. '" 171 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. Debunking the Myth of Fairness in the Contractual Theory 
Although the contractual theory appears to be a favorite among 
courts today,172 it arguably fails to yield equitable results in embryo 
dispute cases. The reasons for this potential inequity are myriad: 
first, parties rarely can fully appreciate the impact of their decisions 
when the agreements are signed, given the highly emotional 
circumstances of the agreement; 173 second, parties rarely anticipate 
166. Id.; see also York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 425 (E.D. Va. 1989) (upholding an 
embryo disposition agreement which called the frozen embryos "property"). 
167. Dehmel, supra note 6, at 1385. 
168. Skouvakis, supra note 164, at 891. 
169. 842 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tenn. 1992). 
170. Vincent F. Stempel, Procreative Rights in Assisted Reproductive Technology: Why 
the Angst?, 62 ALB. L. REV., 1187, 1192 (1999). 
171. /d. at 1192-93. 
172. See Witten v. Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 776 (Iowa 2003). As of 2000, the only state 
to endorse contractual ordering for the disposition of embryos was Florida. Florida, 
however, does not dictate the form or substance of such agreements. Brown, supra 
note 148, at 105; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2005). 
173. See J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 715 (N.J. 2001); see also Christi D. Ahnen, 
Comment, Disputes Over Frozen Embryos: Who Wins, Who Loses, and How Do We 
Decide?-An Analysis o/Davis v. Davis, York v. Jones, and State Statutes Affecting 
Reproductive Choices, 24 CREIGHTONL. REV. 1299, 1346 (1991). 
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that their marriages will end in divorce; 174 and third, although 
embryo agreements may be presumed valid, such agreements are 
often complex and unclear. 175 The following analysis will focus on 
the first and third reasons. 
Few anticipate that they will be faced with infertility issues, and 
when one encounters them, there is little in the way of preparation for 
the roller coaster ride of emotions one experiences. 176 Patients often 
feel as if they lack control of their lives or as if they are failures; 
depression rates are high and marital troubles sometimes develop in 
these situations. l77 Often, infertile women seek treatment "at all 
costs" with total disregard for the ultimate price they may pay 
emotionally, physically, and financially. 178 Given these facts, the 
notion that a person could enter into an embf1;o agreement with a full 
appreciation of its effects is highly doubtful. I 9 
There are also difficulties inherent in obtaining informed consent 
from patients in the substantive form of embryo agreements. 180 For 
example, although such agreements were originally intended to 
inform patients of potential outcomes of the medical procedures in 
which they were to undergo, the actual result has been one in which 
patients simply sWn a form that "overstates the patient's exercise of 
conscious Will.,,1 Medical forms such as embryo agreements are 
often filled with incomprehensible medical and legal language and 
are presented to patients for their signature without attempts to 
engage the patients in "thoughtful deliberation and dialogue.,,182 
Again, under these circumstances, it appears to be nearly impossible 
for a patient to be truly informed about his or her decisions. 
174. J.B., 783 A.2d at 715. 
175. Judith F. Daar, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pregnancy Process: 
Developing an Equality Model to Protect Reproductive Liberties, 25 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 455, 469-70 (1999). 
176. See Waldman, supra note 4, at 923. 
177. See id. 
178. Id. 
179. New Hampshire stands alone in that its legislation regarding the disposition of 
embryos rcquires gamete donors to undergo counseling before beginning the IVF 
process. The law requires "judicial preauthorization" for the approval of disposition 
agreements. See Brown, supra note 148, at 105; see also LaGatta, supra note 11, at 
109. 
180. Waldman, supra note 4, at 924-25. 
181. See id. at 920-21; see also Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 1 03 YALE 
L.J. 899, 933 (1994) (arguing that "the usefulness of informed consent depends on a 
meaningful dialogue between physician and patient," although "the minimally 
necessary ingredients of such a dialogue . . . are usually absent in most clinical 
situations"). 
182. See Waldman, supra note 4, at 921. 
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When such contracts or embryo agreements are entered into, a 
court's decision to enforce them is arguably unconscionable. 183 This 
is not only the result of the fragile emotional and p~sical state of the 
patient at the time the agreement is entered into, I 4 and the murky 
language within the document,185 but it also results from the general 
disparity in the reproductive abilities of the parties. 186 Women are 
most often the infertile patient and are most often the party who finds 
herself "in the twilight of her reproductive years" without a viable 
option for postponing biological parenthood. 187 Men, on the other 
hand, are often able to reproduce well into their seventh decade. 188 
Disparity in bargaining power may arise because a woman might feel 
she has no other option than to sign an embryo agreement, in light of 
her limited reproductive window, even if the terms of the agreement 
are contrary to her true wishes. 189 
The family law section of the American Bar Association first 
recognized the tremendous psychological effect of infertility in 1999 
in its publication of a projosed Assisted Reproductive Technologies 
Model Act (the Act).19 In a section devoted entirely to the 
psychological effects of ART, the authors of the Act address the need 
for in-depth psychological counseling by qualified medical personnel 
before a patient and her partner enter into any embryo agreement. 191 
The purpose of requiring such extensive psychological support for 
patients is to bolster the embryo agreements into which these patients 
may eventually enter. 192 Specifically, the authors of the Act state that 
183. See id. at 926. Critics have also called automatic enforcement of such contracts not 
"entirely sensible" given the added complexity of "contract ambiguity, changed 
circumstances and public policy responses to contracts surrounding reproduction." 
See Daar, supra note 177, at 469. 
184. See Waldman, supra note 4, at 922-24. 
185. Id. at 921. 
186. See id. at 928. 
187. Id. 
188. Waldman, supra note 28, at 1061. 
189. See Waldman, supra note 4, at 926--28; Coleman, supra note 33, at 97-101. 
190. See AMI S. JAEGER ET AL., ASSISTED REPRODUCTION AND GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES 
COMMITTEE, FAMILY LAW SECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES MODEL ACT 10 (1999), http://www .abanet.org/ 
family/committees/ART _modelact 1299 .pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2007). 
191. Id. at 23. The Act states that patients should be counseled by medical personnel who 
have qualifications including a "graduate degree in a mental health profession; ... 
training in the medical and psychological aspects of infertility; ... [and a] minimum 
of one year experience in infertility counseling." Id. 
192. Id. at 23, 25. 
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counseling "provides a template to ensure informed consent for legal 
agreements." 193 
The contractual theory also raises an additional problem. Courts 
that have addressed embryo agreements in disposition cases have 
generally used two very different approaches. Courts have either 
enforced the contract as valid (generally where the agreement has 
been to dispose of the embryos) or refused to enforce embryo 
agreements where the agreement permits the use of the embryos by 
one party while the other party wishes to see the embryos 
destroyed. 194 
This dichotomy of the nationwide judicial approaches to 
contractual ordering becomes evident when the decision in A.Z. v. 
B.Z. is viewed in light of Kass v. Kass and Roman v. Roman. In all 
three cases, the parties had signed embryo agreements that clearly 
stated the respective parties' wishes with regards to the disgosition of 
any unused frozen embryos in the case of death or divorce. 95 
A.Z. is factually distinguishable, however, from the other cases, in 
that the A.Z. embryo agreement awarded custody of the embryos to 
the wife in case of divorce,l96 whereas the other cases involved 
agreements consenting to the destruction of the embryos. 197 In A.Z., 
the court refused to honor the agreement, whereas in the latter cases, 
the courts enforced the agreements. 198 
These differing outcomes suggest that, although, courts have 
historically asserted that legally binding embryo agreements should 
govern, courts do not consistently enforce such agreements. This 
phenomenon causes parties to perceive that embryo agreements are 
ineffectual and that courts will not always honor their contractual 
wishes. 199 
193. Id. at 23. 
194. Waldman, supra note 4, at 899; AZ. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057-58 (Mass. 
2000). 
195. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1051; Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174,176 (N.Y. 1998); Roman v. 
Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40,42 (Tex. App. 2006). 
196. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1054. 
197. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175; Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 42. 
198. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1057; Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180; Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 50. 
199. See Skouvakis, supra note 164, at 889. One reason courts may be hesitant to refuse 
enforcement of an embryo disposition agreement is that the court would be required 
to then decide the legal status of the embryo. "Case law and state legislation have 
developed three legal status categories of preembryos: (I) life; (2) property; and (3) 
something in between deserving special respect." !d. Each category offers unique 
judicial challenges wrought with moral, ethical, and legal implications that 
complicate an embryo agreement analysis. Id. 
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The proposed Act of the American Bar Association offers a 
different solution to cases of divorce where partners differ in their 
desires regarding the disposition of their frozen embryos.200 The Act 
proposes that if the parties agreed to implantation of embryos prior to 
the divorce or separation (in the event of non-married gamete 
providers), the party who wishes to use the embryos ma~ do so 
without the unwilling partner being viewed as a legal parent. 01 This 
approach would permit the infertile patient to pursue biological 
parenthood without implicating the former partner's wish to avoid 
parenthood. 
In evaluating embryo agreements, courts have also considered 
public policy; for example, finding all contracts creating familial 
relationships void. 202 Regardless of the courts' varied approaches, no 
court has considered the extreme hardship that is placed on the 
woman undergoing fertility treatment when evaluating embryo 
agreements. 203 Some feminist scholars argue that the result is unfair 
enrichment to the male gamete provider, who bears little burden in 
the production of the embryos, yet retains most of the control. 204 
Courts generally have denied this "sweat equity" argument and 
instead have chosen to view male and female rcarticipants in ART as 
equals in the production of the embryos. 05 This is because 
opponents argue that: 
Although a woman's physical contribution to the creation 
of an embryo may be greater than that of a man, it is 
undertaken voluntarily and without assurances of ever 
successfully becoming pregnant. Moreover, "the burdens of 
unwanted genetic parenthood will last a lifetime. As such, 
they will greatly outweigh either partner's short-term 
physical investment at the time the embryos were initially 
created. ,,206 
200. ART MODEL ACT, supra note 190, at 41. 
201. Id. 
202. Tracey S. Pachrnan, Disputes Over Frozen Preembryos & the "Right Not to Be a 
Parent," 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 128, 132 (2003). 
203. Id. at 151-52. 
204. See id. at 152. 
205. See Fazila Issa, Note, To Dispose or Not to Dispose: Questioning the Fate of Frozen 
Preembryos After a Divorce in J.B. v. M.B., 39 Hous. L. REv. 1549, 1581 (2003). 
206. Kimberly Berg, Note, Special Respect: For Embryos and Progenitors. 74 GEO. 
WASH. L. REv. 506,527 (2006) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Coleman, supra note 33, 
at 86). 
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Additional criticism may exist for the sweat equity theory because 
it always allows the woman to prevail, even if the male partner is the 
infertile patient. 207 It may be useful, therefore, to consider the female 
partner's sweat equity only if she is the infertile patient and would 
potentially be forced to endure further ART procedures if the existing 
embryos were destroyed. 
B. The Inherent Bias Against Women and Infertile Persons in the 
Courts' Current Approach to Embryo Disposition 
When faced with determining the fate of frozen embryos after 
divorce, courts generally have concluded that the right to avoid 
procreation outweighs the right to biological parenthood. 208 The 
general result of this approach has been disparate in that the male 
litigant has grevailed in destroying the embryos in four out of five 
such cases.2 9 
The Davis court, for example, admitted that had Ms. Davis wished 
to use the embryos for herself, the case would have been "closer" and 
ultimately stated that Ms. Davis still had the right to achieve 
parenthood through adoption. 210 Additionally, the court further 
qualified Ms. Davis's rights to the embryos by stating that the case 
would only be close if she could not become a mother by "any other 
reasonable means.,,211 
One problem with the Davis court's analysis is its failure to define 
reasonable means,212 although the court suggests that adoption may 
be one such reasonable option for Ms. Davis to achieve 
parenthood. 2 13 The problem with the suggestion of adoption as a 
panacea to a party's inability to experience parenthood is its failure to 
account for the challenges that a single person who attempts to adopt 
might face. 214 For example, many adoption agencies have guidelines 
excluding applicants based on age, marital status, and income. 215 As 
a resul~ most single, older women are unable to adopt a healthy 
child. 21 Because of these barriers, adoption is often not a 
207. See Shan a Kaplan, Note, From A To Z: Analysis of Massachusetts' Approach to the 
Enforceability of Cryopreserved Pre-Embryo Dispositional Agreements, 81 B.U. L. 
REv. 1093, 1114 (2001). 
208. See Pachman, supra note 202, at 132. 
209. Id. at 133. 
210. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.w.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992). 
211. Id. 
212. See id. 
213. Id. 
214. See Waldman, supra note 28, at 1056. 
215. Id. at 1058. 
216. See id. at 1056-57. 
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"comparable alternative" to allowing a woman the use of her own 
embryos.217 
Courts also appear to disregard the considerably greater investment 
female litigants have in the ART process. 218 Rather, the courts 
appear to simply assume that adoption or further infertility treatment 
is a suitable alternative to a woman's use of the frozen embryos.219 
The ART process, however, poses greater risks to the health of the 
women who undergo it, as opposed to men, whose participation 
requires little in the way of sacrifice.22o Also, women's fertility 
begins to decline as early as their twenties, so that by the time a 
marriage is dissolved, the female litigant's ability to reproduce is 
likely severely impaired. 221 Conversely, men generally produce 
motile sperm well into their seventh decade. 222 
When courts ignore the biological differences between men and 
women and refuse to include them when balancing the interests of the 
parties, the ultimate result is gender discrimination. 223 Some courts 
attempt to protect themselves from this accusation by citing rights to 
privacy and avowing the protection of personal privacy. 224 
Alternatively, some courts have argued that because a frozen embryo 
is not incorporated into a human body, neither reproductive nor 
privacy rights are involved. 225 Regardless of a court's reasoning for 
setting aside the biological differences of the gamete providers, the 
result is that the courts ignore the vital fact that parties do not view 
217. ld. at 1059. The author also states that the "[j]udicial affinity for this 'solution' 
reveals both insensitivity to the frozen embryo litigants' parental aspirations and a 
profound inattention to the real-world barriers that threaten their fulfillment." ld. 
218. ld. at 1052. 
219. ld. 
220. ld. at 1052-53 (arguing that women face a "more arduous" process because "[a]1I 
that is required [of men] is a private room, an empty jar and, perhaps, a Playboy 
magazine or video."). 
221. See id. at 1054-55. 
222. /d. at 1061. If a man is unable to reproduce biologically because of illness such as 
prostate cancer, his right to frozen preembryos is "as compelling as that of the aging 
divorcee who can no longer produce viable eggs." ld. 
223. Pachman, supra note 202, at 146-47. 
224. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598-600 (Tenn. 1992). In the Davis case, for 
example, the court wrote extensively on the importance of personal autonomy as a 
fundamental human right as expressed in both federal and state law. See id. The 
court focused specifically on procreational autonomy and acknowledged that 
although it is "inherent in our most basic concepts of liberty," its protection under 
federal law is "no longer entirely clear." ld. at 60 I. 
225. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 177, 179 (N.Y. 1998). 
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procreation in the same light, and therefore, do not have an "equal 
interest in the disposition of their frozen embryos.,,226 
Another ramification of the failure to allow for biological 
differences is that infertile women suffer the most dramatic 
impact. 227 It appears that courts feel as though a woman's right to 
reproduce and her ri~ht to bodily integrity attach only at the onset of 
physical pregnancy. 28 Pregnancy, denied to infertile women, 
becomes the "gatekeeper for reproductive rights. ,,229 In order to 
avoid this discrimination against infertile women, courts should view 
pregnancy as a process that encompasses not only the physiological 
side of pregnancy,230 but all the myriad aspects of pregnancy, 
including the preembryo stage. 231 In this way, infertile women will 
be afforded the same rights to privacy and reproduction as fertile 
women, and they will have "equal access to procreational 
autonomy.,,232 
Additional support for the argument that infertile women, and men, 
should be afforded equal access to procreational autonomy can be 
found in the landmark case Bragdon v. Abbott. 233 In Bragdon, the 
U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the ability to 
reproduce was a "ma~or life activity" as defined under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act. 34 With regard to that issue, the Court held: 
We have little difficulty concluding that [reproduction is a 
major life activity]. As the [United States] Court of 
Appeals[, First Circuit] held, "[t]he plain meaning of the 
word 'major' denotes comparative importance" and 
"suggest[s] that the touchstone for determining an activity's 
inclusion under the statutory rubric is its significance." 
Reproduction falls well within the phrase "major life 
226. See Brown, supra note 148, at 103. 
227. See id. The author notes that the Kass decision, although advancing gender equality, 
did so at the expense of infertile women. Id. 
228. !d. at 100-01; see also Daar, supra note 175, at 465 (noting that a pregnant woman 
has the right to control her embryo based on the protection offered by Roe v. Wade, 
whereas a woman undergoing ART does not). A woman with embryos in storage 
will lose control over her embryos over the objection of the male partner because the 
courts title the right not to procreate a compelling state interest. Id. 
229. Daar, supra note 175, at 458. 
230. Id. at 462. 
231. Id. 
232. [d. at 465. 
233. 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
234. Id. at 638-41. 
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activity." Reproduction and the sexual dynamics 
surrounding it are central to the life process itself. 235 
Although the case does not address the issue of infertility directly, 
by analogy the infertile person, like the HIV -positive patient who 
cannot procreate due to her ~hysical limitations, should be included 
in the purview of the ADA. 23 
Another way to provide equal protection to infertile women is to 
cease viewing differently the ri~hts surrounding "coital reproduction" 
and "noncoital reproduction." 37 Fundamental rights would then 
attach to the individual with frozen embryos in storage in the same 
way ther attach to a pregnant female or a person desiring to use birth 
control. 38 If the fundamental rights afforded pregnant women were 
also given to infertile persons, the state could not interfere with their 
choice to utilize frozen embryos to achieve pregnancy.239 Any rule 
that prevented an infertile person from achieving ~regnancy with her 
frozen embryos would be subject to strict scrutiny. 40 
C. The Fallacy of the "Right Not to Parent" Argument 
A common thread among judicial decisions in embryo disposition 
cases is the right to avoid unwanted parenthood. 241 This "judicial 
presumption" asserts that the spouse who opposes use of the embryos 
will automatically be psychologically connected to any resulting 
offspring based solely on their biological connection.242 The result 
for the unwilling parent, courts feel, is one of two options: either the 
235. [d. at 638 (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 
F.3d 934, 939-40 (1997)). 
236. Kevin Yamamoto & Shelby A. D. Moore, A Trust Analysis of a Gestational 
Carrier's Right to Abortion, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 102 n.38 (2001) (noting that 
Bragdon indicates that infertility might be covered by the ADA). 
237. Daar, supra note 175, at 463-64. 
238. See id. 
239. See id. at 464-65. 
240. See id. 
241. See, e.g., A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051,1057-58 (Mass. 2000) (refusing, as a matter 
of public policy, to enforce an embryo disposition agreement that would force an 
unwilling husband to become a father); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 717 (N.J. 2001) 
(arguing that the fundamental right not to procreate meant refusing to force an 
unwilling woman into biological parenthood through donation of her embryos); 
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992) (finding that the right to procreate 
and the right to avoid procreation were of equal significance in deciding on the 
disposition of embryos). For a full discussion of these cases, see supra Parts II.B.I, 
II.C.1. 
242. Waldman, supra note 28, at 1027. 
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parent will feel forced to create a relationship with the child, which 
will thereby be at the parent's own psychological and emotional cost, 
or the parent will reject the child and experience "a permanent and 
agonal sense of 10ss.,,243 
This presumption is easily rebutted, however, with current studies 
on sperm donation and the modem fatherless family.244 Studies have 
found that the majority of sperm donors are little concerned with the 
end result of their donations, even with the strong possibility that the 
end result is a biologically-related child. 245 These findings would 
indicate that biology alone does not create paternal ties. 246 
There is an acknowledged difference between anonymous sperm 
donors and spouses who enter into the ART process with the hope of 
conceiving a child. 247 Studies show, however, that even when 
children are created willingly, biological ties are not indicative of 
parental attachment. 248 These studies reveal that when parents and 
children are separated by distance, and when parents are no longer in 
a romantic relationship with one another, bonds between parents and 
their biological offspring are minimal at best. 249 These studies reveal 
that parental attachment is "socially enacted" and not biological; 
therefore, as biology should not be the basis for rendering judicial 
decisions. 25o 
It is ironic that, whereas courts will enact the "unwilling parent" 
analysis when rendering decisions regarding the use of frozen 
embryos, these same courts disregard this notion if a party becomes 
an unwilling parent through intercourse. 251 
For example, in L. Pamela P. v. Frank s., 252 a man was held to be 
responsible for the welfare of a child created by a sexual relationship 
with the mother, even though the mother lied about her use of 
contraception. 253 The court held that although the respondent had the 
"constitutionally protected right" to make a choice regarding 
becoming a father, that right extended to preventing state interference 
in whether or not a person chooses to use birth control. 254 The court 
243. Id. at 1027-28. 
244. See id. at 1028, 1040--41, 1049. 
245. See id. at 1049-51. 
246. See id. at 1028-29. 
247. See id. at 1052. 
248. See id. at 1041-49. 
249. See id. at 1041-45. 
250. See id. at 1041-49. 
251. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588,603-04 (Tenn. 1992). 
252. 449 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 1983). 
253. See id. at 716. 
254. Id. at 715-16. 
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declined to extend the constitutional protection to include how people 
related privately with one another and the conduct in which they 
chose to engage. 255 
This decision, which is still good law, seems counter to the rulings 
in the frozen embryo dispute cases in that it clearly does not give a 
parent, even one who is deceived into becoming a parent, the right 
not to be one. 256 Current family law states that "[ e ]ven if a father 
[does] not consent to the conception or the gestation of the child," he 
still must take on the responsibilities of fatherhood. 257 By contrast, at 
common law, a father was not required to assume the responsibilities 
of his offspring even though a mother was required to assume such 
responsibilities. 258 At common law, therefore, an unwilling father, 
like the parties in modem frozen embryo cases, had the right "not to 
parent" if he so pleased. 259 It would appear that the modem judicial 
approach encompassing the "right not to parent," then, is antiquated 
and gender-biased. 
When justifying the use of the right not to parent analysis, some 
courts have invoked the spirit of a woman's right to have an 
abortion. 260 Arguably, when a woman is given the right to end her 
pregnancy, she is awarded the right not to parent. 261 Proponents of 
the right not to parent theory feel that if an embryo may be implanted 
against a male partner's wishes, then the female's rights become 
superior, and thus gender bias is born. 262 
The converse argument, however, is that Roe v. Wade encompasses 
a woman's right to bodily integrity, and fails to address her right not 
to be a parent. 263 As one scholar states: 
[T]he fact that these burdens [associated with bearing an 
unwanted child] may be overcome by the interests of the 
state, which has no biological connection or presumed 
obligation to support the unwanted child, suggests that, apart 
from doing as she chooses with her own body, a woman has 
little, if any, right not to be a parent. 264 
255. Jd. at 716. 
256. See id. at 714-16. 
257. Pachman, supra note 202, at 143. 
258. Jd. at 143-44. 
259. See id. at 143. 
260. See id. at 144-45. 
261. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
262. See Dehmel, supra note 6, at 1401-02. 
263. Pachman, supra note 202, at 144. 
264. Jd. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Even though courts nationwide have used varied approaches in 
their analyses of frozen embryo dispute resolution, none have 
addressed the particular needs of the party who is at the most 
disadvantage-the infertile patient. Most often this is the female 
whose ability to procreate may not only be limited by medical 
reasons, but by the simple virtue of her narrow window of time for 
reproduction. 
The current application of the contractual theory gives little weight 
to the physical and emotional stress patients are under when signing 
convoluted embryo agreements that will alter the rest of the patient's 
life. Likewise, the balancing/best interest test, though gender neutral 
on the surface, is riddled with gender bias against women, and in 
particular infertile women. 
It is vital that Maryland adopt an equitable judicial framework for 
resolving embryo disposition disputes so that when cases inevitably 
end up in Maryland's courtrooms for resolution, guidance is available 
to aid in rendering truly fair results. 
Melissa Boatman 
